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Two Field Experiments on Self-Selection, Collaboration Intensity,  
and Team Performance 
by Mira Fischer, Rainer Michael Rilke, and B. Burcin Yurtoglu* 
We analyze how the team formation process influences the ability composition and 
performance of teams, showing how self-selection and random assignment affect team 
performance for different tasks in two natural field experiments. We identify the 
collaboration intensity of the task as the key driver of the effect of self-selection on team 
performance. We find that when the task requires low collaborative efforts, the team 
performance of self-selected teams is significantly inferior to that of randomly assigned 
teams. When the task involves more collaborative efforts, self-selected teams tend to 
outperform randomly assigned teams. We observe assortative matching in self-selected 
teams, with subjects more likely to match with those of similar ability and the same 
gender. 
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1 Introduction
In today’s highly complex economic environment, cooperation among individuals is crucial
for organizational success. As business becomes increasingly global and cross-functional, the
adoption of teamwork increases in all domains of work life (O’Neill and Salas, 2018; Cross
et al., 2016). The nature and effectiveness of teamwork in a variety of productive activities
matter for outcomes in diverse settings ranging from entrepreneurial ventures (Reagans and
Zuckerman, 2019) to the mutual fund industry (Patel and Sarkissian, 2017) and from medical
practice (Geraghty and Paterson-Brown, 2018) to achieving scientific breakthroughs (Wuchty
et al., 2007).
Recognizing the importance of cooperation in teams, economists and management scholars are
extensively studying the influence of various forms of team incentives (e.g., team bonuses or
tournaments) on team performance. While team bonuses and team piece rates tend to have a
positive influence on productivity (e.g., Englmaier et al., 2018; Friebel et al., 2017; Hamilton
et al., 2003; Erev et al., 1993), the evidence on the influence of team tournament incentives on
performance is ambiguous (e.g., Delfgaauw et al., 2019, 2018; Bandiera et al., 2013). Thus
the precise channel through which team incentives lead to differences in team performance
remains an open question.
Moreover, another performance-enhancing effect has gone largely unnoticed: the power of team
incentives to influence the team formation process and, through it, team performance. When
people are allowed to choose their teammates, they tend to match with people they like (e.g.,
Curranrini et al., 2009). However, they also appear to trade off both the pecuniary benefits
from better cooperation and the non-pecuniary benefits of working in teams with friends
against the pecuniary benefits stemming from working with higher-ability team members
(Bandiera et al., 2013; Hamilton et al., 2003).1
1Other laboratory experiments examine the link between different group formation mechanisms in public
goods or minimum-effort games. This literature shows that the level of cooperation in endogenously formed
groups is similar to the level of contributions in groups with exogenous matching (e.g., Gächter and Thöni,
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Only a small number of studies focus on the effects of team composition. Therefore, very little
is known about the different effects on team performance of self-selection versus the random
assignment of team members. Indeed, while studies in this literature find that self-selection
can lead to higher team performance (Dahlander et al., 2019; Chen and Gong, 2018; Hamilton
et al., 2003), none of them look at whether this effect varies across tasks with different levels
of collaboration intensity or how self-selection influences the ability composition of teams.
This study both analyzes how the team formation process influences the ability composition
of teams and team performance, and thus shows how self-selection and random assignment
influence team performance for different tasks. Using two randomized natural field experiments,
we identify the collaboration intensity of the team task as the key driver of the effect of self-
selection on team performance.
We expect that endogenous team formation will lead to a higher degree of cooperation and a
concentration of people with similar abilities and social preferences within teams. Consequently,
self-selection should lead to a larger variance in team performance than in randomly assigned
teams. However, whether these selection patterns lead to the overall superior performance of
self-selected teams is prima facie unclear.
We argue that the impact of team formation on performance will hinge on the production
function of a particular team task. The practical relevance of this question stems from team
tasks taking different forms. For example, when a team of employees is assigned a task such
as implementing a strategy or preparing a presentation of a product, the teammates have to
work closely together to combine their efforts effectively. This process requires high-intensity
collaboration, which is easier when the teammates already know one another, but individual
abilities may not be as important. In contrast, a team of employees tasked to invent a new
product or create a new research idea are involved in a process requiring a lower intensity of
collaboration, so that the ability of each individual matters more for the team’s outcome.
2005; Guido et al., 2019; Chen, 2017). A related and higher-level question of why people choose to join teams
at all has recently also been investigated in laboratory experiments (Cooper et al., 2019).
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Thus, when the underlying task is collaboration-intensive, we hypothesize that self-selection is
beneficial for average team performance because it increases collaborative efforts. However,
when the underlying task is ability-intensive, self-selection can be detrimental to average
team performance because it leads to a concentration of skills in some of the teams. To test
this hypothesis, we conduct a randomized field experiment that incorporates tasks requiring
different intensities of collaborative efforts.
We embed the experiments in a mandatory course for first-year undergraduate students at a
major German business school. We conducted the experiments during the winter quarters
2017/18 and 2018/19 with two cohorts of students randomly assigned to two separate study
groups. In both experiments each study group received the same course content from the same
instructor but in separate classes. The course required the students to work on two distinct
tasks in teams of two. In one class, the instructor told the students on the first day to form a
team with a fellow student of their choice. The students also had to give the instructor their
teammate choice in written form before the next class (treatment Self ). In the other class,
students were randomly assigned to a team of two before the second class meeting (treatment
Random).
All teams had to work on two types of tasks that were similar in the skill set they required but
different in terms of collaboration intensity: a written task and a presentation task involving
the participation of both teammates. In both tasks, teams had to solve microeconomics
problems, and their grades depended solely on the accuracy of their solutions, presented in
written form and presentation form, respectively. For the written task, we expected that if one
student alone came up with the correct solution, whether the other team member could also
produce it would be of less relevance, so that collaboration was necessary only for agreeing on
the solution to be submitted. In contrast, for the presentation task, we expected collaboration
to be essential for ensuring that each member could present their parts of the correct solution
and for ensuring coherence of the different parts.
For the ability-intensive written task, we first find that the self-selected teams performed
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significantly worse than the randomly assigned teams, whereas, for the collaboration-intensive
presentation task, self-selected teams performed better overall. We then studied two channels
through which the team formation process may affect outcomes: ability composition and the
quality of within-team cooperation. Consistent with prior empirical evidence, we find that
self-selection results in teams of students with more similar abilities. In contrast, random
assignment increases the spread of high-ability students across teams, thereby increasing the
number of teams with at least one high-ability member. We also find that self-selection enables
more students to work with a teammate whom they like and with whom they cooperate more
intensively, a factor that seems to drive the superior performance in the more cooperative task.
Our study adds to the thus far small literature examining the consequences of team composition
mechanisms in real-world settings. Chen and Gong (2018) find that university students who
may self-select their teammates perform better on a presentation task than students who are
randomly assigned to teams. Likewise, Dahlander et al. (2019) find that students – in an
entrepreneurial task – who can freely choose with whom they want to work with perform
better when they were given an entrepreneurial task as to when the group is free to choose
their task. While Chen and Gong (2018) show that self-selection leads to team formation
based on social connections rather than member skills, neither they nor Dahlander et al. (2019)
examine how the assignment mechanism affects actual skill composition within groups. Our
setting, however, allows for a nuanced assessment of the compositional effects of different
mechanisms of team formation.
Our study makes three contributions to the literature. First, we formalize how the ways teams
form may interact with task features to affect performance. Second, using two randomized
natural field experiments, we test how self-selection of teammates affects ability composition
as well as team performance in different tasks. Finally, our study combines theses insights to
offer an explanation of how the effect of self-selection on team composition may explain why
self-selected teams are superior in tasks that require a high level of collaborative efforts but
not in other team tasks.
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Specifically, our study shows that these differential effects are likely due to the potential of
the self-selection mechanism affecting both the social and ability composition of teams. In a
task that, beyond cognitive skills, requires a high level of collaborative efforts, self-selection
is favorable because it allows friends to work together. However, if the task problem can be
solved primarily by cognitive skills, then self-selection—by raising the proportion of teams in
which both members have low ability—leads to lower overall performance.
2 Theoretical considerations
We introduce a theoretical framework to demonstrate why the ability composition of the team
and the intensity of cooperation can affect team performance, depending on the type of task.
We consider two types of team tasks: an ability-intensive task, in which teams have to submit
a handwritten solution to a problem set, and a collaboration-intensive task, in which teams
have to submit a short video presentation of their solution to a problem set (section 3.3 gives
a detailed description of the two tasks).
Two students, denoted as i and j, have to form a team. Each teammate has a unidimensional
cognitive ability level ai for solving the task. Providing the right solution to problem sets is
determined by the ability composition of the team and the quantity of collaborative effort
(qi,j) between both teammates.
We assume that the quality of the team’s solution, s, depends on the ability level of the ablest
student and the level of collaborative effort between the two teammates. The higher one
teammate’s ability and the higher the collaborative effort between the two teammates, the
better the solution will be. A task may differ by the relative amount of cognitive skills and
collaboration necessary for solving. We introduce the weights p and 1− p for representing the
relative importance of cognitive skills and collaboration, respectively. Thus the quality of the
team’s solution, s, is given by:
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s = p ·max(ai, aj) + (1− p) · qi,j.
Although highly stylized, this relationship captures the intuition that, in a task that is highly
dependent on the one dimension of cognitive ability, only the ability of the ablest teammate
matters for team performance. If one person can find a suitable solution to a problem or
spot the mistakes in the other teammate’s solutions, the ability of the other teammate is not
important, and such a task does not require any collaborative effort qi,j = 0. Thus, in the
ability-intensive team task, the team grade is determined by (sa):
sa = max(ai, aj).
In contrast, in the collaboration-intensive team task, in addition to finding the right solution,
both students have to actively participate in presenting their team solution in a short video
clip. We assume that, in addition to cognitive ability, this task requires a certain degree of
collaboration. We expect that the level of collaborative effort is higher in self-selected teams
due to better communication, a higher willingness to help the other member, and higher
intrinsic motivation. In this case, the team’s grade (sc) is determined by the weighted sum of
the maximum ability and the quality of collaboration:
sc = p ·max(ai, aj) + (1− p) · qi,j.
The literature suggests that when subjects are allowed to choose their teammates, they tend
to choose a teammate who has similar abilities and with whom they are acquainted. Thus
the maximum ability in self-selected teams is—on average—lower than in randomly assigned
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teams. Yet the expected quality of collaboration is higher in self-selected teams. Therefore,
we expect that randomly assigned teams perform—on average better—on the written task
than self-selected teams. Furthermore, we expect the advantage of the randomly assigned
teams over the self-selected teams to be smaller in the presentation task, because self-selected
teams lacking a high-ability member can usually make up for this disadvantage by superior
cooperation. If p is sufficiently small (i.e., the importance of collaborative effort is higher and
the importance of the maximum ability within the team is lower), then self-selected teams
may even outperform randomly assigned teams.
3 Study
3.1 Context and background
The field experiment was conducted with students of the BSc program at a German business
school between October 2017 and April 2019. The business school offers university education
in business administration, with degrees at the BSc, MSc, MBA, and PhD levels, as well as
executive education programs. The school has around 2000 students. At the BSc level, the
school offers the International Business Administration program, to which the school admits
roughly 230 students in each year. In academic year 2017/2018, a total of 672 students were
enrolled in the program, 26% of whom were female.
Studying the impact of team formation mechanisms on team performance requires an envi-
ronment in which participants can choose teammates, in which the selection mechanism can
be exogenously varied, and in which team performance can be objectively measured. The
environment of the business school class we study fulfills all of these criteria while allowing
us to maintain a high degree of control. Furthermore, to observe self-selection not only on
demographic characteristics but also on ability we need a sample of participants that have
prior acquaintance with each other. This is given for our student subjects as the class takes
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place at a point in time when students already completed courses together and had ample
opportunities to get to know each other at extra-curricular activities (e.g., student societies,
sports teams, and opportunities for involvement in music, drama, political campaigning, or
community work) organized at the business school, located in a small town.
3.2 Experimental timeline and treatments
The field experiments took place in the Microeconomics I course, with two cohorts of first-year
students in the BSc program in International Business Administration. In each cohort, students
were randomly assigned to two separate classes, both taught by the same instructor (one
in the morning and one in the afternoon of the same day). During the first week, students
learned that fulfilling the course requirements included completing two tasks in teams of two
and passing an exam at the end of the quarter. As the instructor did not announce any
task-specific details on the team tasks in the first week, the students knew only that these tasks
were take-home assignments that they had to complete during study hours. They also knew
that they would have to solve both tasks with the same team member, because re-matching
was not permitted.
For each cohort, in one class—the Self treatment—the instructor told the students on the first
day to form a team with a fellow student of their choice. Students had to submit their team
composition to the instructor in writing before the second meeting. In the other class—the
Random treatment—students were randomly assigned to a team of two, and team composition
was announced by email before the second meeting.
The first team task, handed out in mid-November, had to be submitted in early December.
The second team task, handed out in early December, had to be submitted by the end of
January. The final exam took place in March. During the course students received no feedback
on their performance in the team tasks. After the final exam, feedback consisted only of
students’ overall course grade. Upon request students could also receive detailed information
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on both their team’s performance in the different tasks and their individual performance in
the exam. Figure 1 displays the timeline of the experiment.
In the winter quarter of 2017/18 (Experiment I, n=190, 31% female) students completed two
written team tasks, whereas in the winter quarter of 2018/19 (Experiment II, n=192, 29%
female), the first was a written task and the second was a presentation task. Across both
experiments the first task was identical and the solutions were supposed to be submitted
in written form. The second task, although very similar in content, differed between both
experiments; while in Experiment I solutions were supposed to be submitted in written form,
in Experiment II students were required to give a presentation (see subsection 3.3). This
design allows us to identify interaction effects of the team formation mechanism with task
characteristics as well as possible heterogeneous trends in collaboration across treatments.
3.3 Tasks
Given that we expected the effect of the team assignment mechanism on team performance to
hinge on the degree of collaboration intensity in a given task, we chose two tasks that differed
in collaboration intensity: a written task and a presentation task.2 Although the written task
required students to reach an agreement on whose solution is best, one student may produce
the correct solution by himself or herself. In contrast, the presentation task requires students
to jointly prepare a presentation in which both teammates’ contributions had to be visible.
This process required a higher degree of cooperation and coordination than simply agreeing on
the best solution. In both the written and presentation tasks, students’ solutions were graded
solely on the correctness of their answers.
The written tasks consisted of microeconomic problems for which students had to submit
written solutions. These problems called for applications of the theoretical knowledge that
students had acquired during class lectures, such as analyzing demand patterns, calculating
2The exercise sets appear in the online appendix.
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market outcomes, or designing pricing strategies. A solution usually involved an explanation
of the theoretical background, a correct approach to the solution, and a series of calculations
that possibly included one or two graphs.
In addition, the instructions for the written tasks specified that the students had to present
their written answers clearly. Answers could be either typed or handwritten and they had
to be legible. Some questions required outlining a correct methodological approach and the
corresponding calculation. Other questions required conceptual explanations in complete
sentences, or also in bullet points if they were clear and significant.
The presentation task consisted of questions for which students had to submit their solutions in a
five-minute presentation (recorded as a video). The questions required a level of microeconomics
skills similar to that in the written task. The instructions required both team members—and
their individual contributions—be visible in the video.
In addition, the instructions specified that the video should be comprehensible, i.e., it should be
possible to understand the presenters’ speech. Teams were allowed to use graphs, illustrations,
and slides to make their presentations more effective. The instructions further stated that
teams could use their smartphones to produce the video and that the technical quality of the
video itself would not be graded.
Although we conducted our experiments in an educational setting, the characteristics of the
two tasks share commonalities with a variety of tasks in many organizational settings. The
written tasks resembles problem-solving in product and strategy development, which call for
high levels of technical skills. In contrast, the presentation task—while keeping constant the
level of technical skills required—requires students to collaborate effectively. The presentation
component thus resembles tasks in production and service jobs that do not require specific




Data for the study was gathered from three distinct sources (see figure 1). Our baseline data
contains students’ high school performance (GPA), their performance on the admissions tests,
and student-level demographic information. Both the GPA and the results of the admissions
tests are clean measures of pre-experiment academic ability as they are not affected by peers
at the business school. Moreover, our data contains information on students’ performance
in the two team tasks and on the final course exam at the end of the quarter. The endline
data includes information collected through a post-experiment survey, in which we elicited
students’ perceptions of cooperative behavior in their team and their prior relationship with
their team member. Furthermore, it contained an incentivized measure of pro-sociality. We
provide a more detailed description of the different data sources in the following subsections.
3.4.1 Pre-experiment ability measures
Our pre-experiment ability measures and demographic variables come from the business
school’s student registry, in particular its admissions data. The business school’s program,
which is known as highly competitive, uses a selective admissions procedure. In the first step of
the admissions process, applicants to the BSc program provide basic background information
and their high school grade point average (GPA).3 The admissions office ranks applicants
by their GPA and invites the top 10% to an admissions day, where applicants have to give
an oral presentation, participate in a group discussion, and take part in an interview. Two
evaluators rate the applicants’ performance on these tasks on a scale from 1 to 10. Towards
the end of the admissions day, applicants take an analytical test, on which their performance
is also rated on a scale from 1 to 10.
3The German GPA (Abiturnote) ranges from 4.0 (the worst) to 1.0 (the best) grade and is the most
important criterion for university admission in Germany (e.g., Fischer and Kampkötter, 2017). Our entire
sample has an average GPA of 1.79 (SD=.504). For our analysis, we invert the GPA so that higher values
indicate better grades.
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The first applicant task is to give a 15-minute presentation on a self-chosen topic (Presentation).
A round of questions by two evaluators then follows, for up to five minutes. Applicants are
evaluated on the presentation content and structure (e.g., is it logically structured), the
presentation format and delivery (e.g., is the diction articulate), and on the quality of dialogue
and their ability to respond to questions.
The second applicant task is to participate in a group discussion (Discussion) on a topic
given to them on the spot. The discussion takes 50 minutes. Evaluators rank applicants
according to group-related behavior (e.g., does the applicant contribute to a group solution),
problem-related behavior (e.g., is the applicant able to argue well and convince others), and
management-related behavior (e.g., does the applicant motivate other group members or
search for compromises between opposing views).
The third applicant task is an individual interview (Interview). Evaluators ask questions about
the student’s personal background to assess the student as a future business administration
student. Moreover, the evaluators rate the candidates’ likelihood to persevere with their career
goals.
The fourth applicant task is an analytical test (Analytical test), during which applicants solve
quantitative problems, including diagramming techniques from the business world. Applicants
have 60 minutes to complete the test. This written task, which constitutes the final round of
the admissions testing, helps the school assess the analytical reasoning skills of the candidates.
The subjective ratings of both evaluators on the first three tasks are averaged and then added
to the score on the analytical test. The result represents the applicant’s final score. The
admissions office ranks students according to this score and offers the best candidates a place
in the program.
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3.4.2 Measures of team performance and exam outcomes
Students’ performance on both team tasks and the individual exam determined their final
grade. Each team received a common grade for their performance per task and each task had
a weight of 15% towards the individual final grade. The exam was written in the end of the
course and contributed 70% to the final grade. Student assistants blinded to the experiment
graded the performance on the team tasks and exam.
3.4.3 Post-experiment survey
On the day following the final exam, we invited the students to take part in an online post-
experiment survey. This survey elicited students’ perceptions of collaboration in their team,
their prior relationship to and beliefs about their teammate’s performance, and perceptions of
the quality of teaching. To incentivize participation, we used a raffle.4 Among all participants
of the survey, a random draw was to pick one student, who would receive 200 EUR as a reward.
For an incentivized measure of students’ pro-sociality, we asked students which fraction of this
amount they would like to donate to UNICEF if they won.
4 Results
We organize the presentation of our results around our main research question: How does
self-selection influence team performance? We begin our analysis by establishing the internal
validity of our experimental approach. We show that the student sample does not differ
between the treatments on any observable variable elicited before the experiments. Then
we analyze the influence of the two assignment mechanisms on performance. Our results
show that team performance by randomly assigned teams is higher than that by self-selected
4An overview of the survey questions appears in Table 5, which we discuss in Section 4.3.2.
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teams for a task not requiring close collaboration. However, for a task that requires teammate
cooperation, the randomly assigned teams tend to perform worse than the self-selected ones.
We then explore the mechanisms through which team formation affects performance.
4.1 Randomization checks
Table 1 provides an overview of the properties of our sample in the treatments and the
experiments. We show separate summary statistics for Experiment I, Experiment II, and
pooled for both experiments. The table shows that the randomization was successful in
producing highly similar groups based on observable characteristics such as high school
performance (GPA) and performance on the admissions test. The only characteristic that
differs significantly between treatments in Experiment II is the percentage of female students
(p = .038, χ2-test, one-sided).5 We therefore provide results from two regression specifications,
both with and without controlling for gender (and other observables).
4.2 Team performance
Our objective outcome measure of performance is the score that teams receive for their work
on two separate tasks during the quarter. We summarize our results in Figure 2, which plots
the standardized average team score for each task and the individual performance on the
final exam. The left panel shows the outcomes for Experiment I; the right panel shows the
outcomes for Experiment II.
For Experiment I, where the first and the second team tasks had to be submitted in written
form, the figure indicates that—on average—teams in Random perform better than teams in
Self. A non-parametric comparison of average team scores yields a significantly lower score
for teams in Self than teams in Random (p = .007, Mann-Whitney U test) (hereafter MWU
5Unless otherwise stated, all p-values are based on two-sided tests.
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test). A non-parametric test for the equality of variances between the treatments underlines
this pattern and shows that the variance of team performance is significantly larger in the
Self treatment (p = .002, Levene’s test).6 We also observe no change in performance over
time. A comparison of average performance between the first and second team tasks reveals
no significant differences (Self : p = .885, Random: p = .9291, MWU test). Neither average
student performance nor variance of student performance on the final exam differs significantly
across treatments (p = .455, MWU test; p = .995, Levene’s test).
First, for Experiment II, the figure indicates that teams in Self perform worse on the written
task than those in Random, while the effect appears reversed when the teams work on the
video task. Consequently, in the first team task of Experiment II, we replicate the observed
pattern of Experiment I. Again, teams in Self perform significantly worse than those in
Random when the task is written, but this time the variances are not significantly different
(p = .064, MWU test; p = .194, Levene’s test). A look at Figure 2 reveals that the average
team performance is higher in Self than in Random in the second team task (presentation
task). However, non-parametric tests comparing the mean and the variance of average team
performance between Self and Random cannot reject the null hypothesis that performance in
both treatments is equal (p = .156, MWU test; p = .381, Levene’s test).
Second, we run regressions controlling for pre-experiment observables (i.e., GPA, admissions
test score, gender) to verify these outcomes. To do so, we analyze the teams’ performance for
the first (written) and second (written or presentation) team tasks across both experiments.
The first team task in both experiments was identical, with students submitting their work in
writing. To test the influence of task characteristics on team performance, we vary the second
team task. In Experiment I, teams had to submit their solutions in written form, while in
Experiment II, teams had to submit video presentations (as described earlier). We use OLS
regressions with standard errors clustered at the team level.
6A separate analysis of the first and second team task yields similar significant differences in averages (1st
team task: p = .011, 2nd team task: p = .068, MWU test), and (marginally) significant differences in variances
(1st team task: p = .104, 2nd team task: p = .001, Levene’s test). A detailed pairwise comparison appears in
Table A.1 in the Appendix.
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Table 2 shows the results of the regression analysis, where the dependent variable is the team
performance (z-standardized) for the both team tasks, separately. In Models (1)-(3), we predict
the team performance on the first team task. Model (1) includes only a dummy variable for the
treatment Self (“1 if Self ”). Self-selected teams perform on average .42 standard deviations
worse at the first task than randomly-assigned teams. Model (2) includes a dummy variable
for the experiment (“1 if Experiment II”) and an interaction term of the Self treatment and
the experiment (“1 if Self x 1 if Experiment II”) to control for potential interactions. While
both of these control variables remain insignificant, the coefficient on the treatment dummy
Self remains significant and almost unchanged at -.47, indicating that, for the first task, the
treatment effect is not significantly different across experiments. In Model (3) we include
additional controls, finding that the treatment effect is not affected by their inclusion. We
find that GPA, but not the admissions test score, predicts team performance.
Next, we study the second team task. The regression results appear in Models (4)-(6). In
Model (4), we pool observations from both experiments (ignoring the type of task) and include
only a treatment dummy. Consistent with the results of the non-parametric analysis, we find
no significant effect of self-selection, suggesting that a meaningful investigation of the effects
of team assignment on performance should take into account the task characteristics. After
we control for the experiment and interact with the treatment, we find that teams in the Self
treatment in Experiment I performed .50 standard deviations worse in the second task than
teams in the Random treatment (model 5). We thus find very similar treatment effects for the
first and the second tasks in Experiment I, suggesting that there is no heterogeneous learning
across treatments and that the ordering of the tasks does not matter.
In addition, adding up the first and the third coefficients in Model (5), we find that in
Experiment II, in the second task (a presentation), teams in Self tended to perform .28
standard deviations better than teams in Random. In line with the non-parametric analysis, a
joint F-test shows that this difference is not significant (p = .1774).
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4.3 Mechanisms
The critical question that now arises is why self-selection has a detrimental effect on team
performance in ability-intensive but not in collaboration-intensive tasks. We shed light on two
mechanisms that help answer this question. Specifically, we originally hypothesized that our
treatment variation would influence the composition of teams and the quality of within-team
cooperation. We expected that when individuals can self-select into teams, they would tend
to prefer teammates with similar characteristics and abilities, and thus exhibit higher quality
cooperation.
4.3.1 Team composition
We begin by looking into how students (in treatment Self ) form teams. To do so, we use
pre-experiment registry data on students’ ability (measured as their performance on the
various tasks in the admissions test and their GPA), gender, and an incentivized measure of
pro-sociality from the post-experiment survey. For each team and measure m, we calculate
the absolute difference between both teammates
mij = |xi − xj|
where i and j are teammates.
Thus lower absolute differences indicate higher similarity of teammates, and higher values
indicate higher dissimilarity. If students in Self were to match on certain measures, we would
observe a higher similarity, i.e., a lower average absolute difference. Moreover, as a reference
point, we calculate the average absolute difference after simulating the matching of each
student with all potential teammates from the respective treatment. This simulation provides
us with information on how a within-sample random team composition would hypothetically
look.
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The results appear in Table 3. The first column shows the absolute difference for all measures
in Self, while the second column shows the absolute difference for all measures in the simulated
Random “treatment.” A comparison of the values in the first and the second columns suggests
that students sort themselves into teams with students of similar levels of ability and pro-
sociality, and the same gender. More specifically, we observe that self-selected teams display a
higher degree of similarity in terms of their GPA, their score on the analytical test, and gender.
These differences are significant (GPA: p = .003; Analytical test: p = .012; Female: p = .0001,
Wilcoxon signed rank test, WSR test). Interestingly, we do not find significant differences in
either the Self treatment or the simulated Random “treatment” for interview, discussion, and
presentation skills.7 Furthermore, students tend to have more similar levels of pro-sociality
in the Self treatment, however, this difference not statistically significant (Pro-sociality: p =
.224).
We observe that the teams in Self are significantly more homogeneous in terms of ability
(GPA, analytical test) and gender, and tend to be more similar in terms of their pro-sociality.
This observation suggests that high levels of ability and pro-sociality (and same gender) are
desirable characteristics in a potential teammate. We further investigate whether students in
treatment Self trade off these two desirable characteristics against each other. To do so, we
examine whether (a) the student’s ability positively predicts the teammate’s ability, (b) the
student’s pro-sociality positively predicts the teammate’s pro-sociality (as suggested by the
previous analysis of similarity) and (c) whether the student’s pro-sociality also predicts the
teammate’s ability and vice versa.
In Table 4 (model 1) we regress GPA on the teammate’s GPA. The positive and significant
coefficient (p = .019) indicates that more (less) able students match with more (less) able
teammates. This association is robust and stays significant at conventional levels after the
inclusion of various additional control variables such as the student’s and the teammate’s
scores on the analytical test (model 2), and the individual’s and the teammate’s level of
7These measures also do not correlate with performance on the different team tasks (see table A.2).
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pro-sociality (model 3). This finding corroborates the results in Table 3 that a student’s score
on the analytical test does not predict his or her teammate’s GPA. Model (3) shows that the
student’s pro-sociality positively predicts the teammate’s ability.
In Models (4)-(6) we regress the GPA, the analytical test score and pro-sociality on the
teammate’s score in the analytical test but find no significant associations. Model (7) shows
that the student’s pro-sociality does not significantly predict the teammate’s pro-sociality.
Moreover, the student’s GPA positively predicts the teammate’s pro-sociality (model 8), also
when we control for the student’s pro-sociality (model 9).
Overall, the findings in Tables 3 and 4 show (a) that students tend to choose a teammate of
similar abilities and the same gender, (b) that students of higher ability (independent of their
own pro-sociality) match with more pro-social teammates, and (c) that students who are more
pro-social (independent of their own ability) match with higher-ability teammates. These
findings suggest that a high level of ability, a high level of pro-sociality, and the same gender
are desirable traits in a teammate because students expect them to positively contribute to
team performance, to make working together more pleasant, or both. The next subsection
investigates whether this student expectation is fulfilled.8
4.3.2 Collaborative behavior within teams
A second mechanism that we hypothesized to be affected by the treatment variation and to
influence team performance is the quality of cooperation. In our post-experiment survey, we
asked students to evaluate their collaboration experience in their team during the course (see
table 5 for an overview of all questions).
We asked students to agree or disagree (on a 7-point Likert scale) with several statements
aimed at capturing various aspects of team collaboration and organization. More specifically,
8We run the very same analysis with the data from Random. The results appear in Table A.3 in the
Appendix. We observe no systematic patterns here, although some coefficients are weakly significant.
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we also asked questions about the perceived quality of cooperation and the pleasure of working
together.9
Table 5 reports the results from the post-experiment survey, pooled for Experiments I and
II and for each experiment separately. For their experience during the task, students in Self
reported having communicated more (“We communicated a lot”; p < .0001, MWU test) and
to have cooperated better (“We helped each other a lot”; p = .0188) than students in Random.
Moreover, they indicated that the teammates’ contributions were more equally distributed
(“Both team members contributed equally”; p = .021) and that both teammates exerted effort
(“Both team members exerted effort”; p = .002). These comparisons clearly show that teams
in Random solve the problem sets with a different approach than teams in Self, likely by
assigning the task to the more able teammate but also cooperating less.10
Furthermore, the student’s mood (“The mood in our team was good”; p = .189), levels of stress
(“Our team was very stressed.”; p = .134), and motivation (“Our team was very motivated”;
p = .151) in teams in Self was not different in their teams compared to teams in Random.
Although student in Self were more likely to report being friends (“My team member was a
friend”; p < .0001) or having been acquainted with their teammate before the course (“I knew
the team member very well before the course”; p < .0001), it was not the overall pleasure of
working together but rather the higher level of cooperation that was different in team between
the treatments.
These findings highlight a potentially important channel through which random assignment
may increase performance in the written task while tending to decrease performance in the
9We also ask a battery of questions about the perceived teaching quality, which might influence performance.
However, we found no significant differences between the treatments and experiments, indicating that the
lecturer’s teaching was of the same quality in both classes and experiments.
10As Table 5 shows, these differences between the treatments are mostly driven by the reports of students
from Experiment I, where students were not explicitly required to collaborate. As the video presentation in
Experiment II required each teammate to cooperate equally and to appear in the video to present the results,
they might have tried to fulfill this expectation. Therefore, a desirability bias might explain why we do not
find as strong a difference in self-reported cooperation in Experiment II as in Experiment I. That the average
ratings of cooperation also tend to be higher in Self in Experiment II than in Experiment I points in the same
direction.
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presentation task. For the written task, which requires fewer collaborative efforts, letting the
ablest student perform the task is most efficient; for the presentation task, which requires
collaborative efforts, both communication and coordination work better in self-selected teams.11
5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence from a two natural field experiments that study how team
formation processes influence team performance. We use data on the individual characteristics
and behavior of students at a business school to understand the effect on team performance of
varying both the team formation process and the collaboration-intensity of tasks. The results
of our randomized field experiments add a new dimension to the debate on the effects of team
formation on team performance. Previous experiments do not use objective ability measures
to capture selection patterns, nor do they offer an explanation for observed effects of the team
formation process on performance at different tasks. In these natural field experiments, we
use registry data on student ability generated prior to the experiments to study how the team
formation process affects the teams’ ability and social composition, which in turn affect team
performance in two distinct team tasks with different collaboration intensities.
We find that the team formation mechanism chosen for assigning subjects to teams is a useful
tool for strategically inducing performance. Importantly, this relationship hinges on the specific
requirements of the underlying task. When subjects are allowed to choose their teammate, the
team assignment mechanism substantially influences performance on the team tasks through
assortative selection patterns. These selection patterns prove to be performance-enhancing
when the underlying task requires a high degree of collaborative efforts. In contrast, random
assignment of teammates leads to better team performance when the task requires little
1170% (Experiment I: 74%, Experiment II: 67%) of students responded to our request to participate in the
survey. We test and find no significant difference in the fraction of participating students between Random
and Self (Experiment I: p = .282, Experiment II: p = .261, χ2 test). Furthermore, participation in the survey
was balanced for GPA (p = .146, p = .466, MWU test), the analytical test (p = .091, p = .334, MWU test),
and gender (p = .730, p = .822, χ2 test).
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collaborative efforts but a high level of (unidimensional) technical skills. After the team
task, we measure individual performance of subjects and find no differences between the team
formation mechanisms, indicating that the effect that we observe at the team-level does not
translate to individual performance differences.
The study offers valuable insights for managers and team leaders, i.e., those who decide how
teams are put together in firms and other organizations. If managers want to maximize team
performance, they first need to consider the type of task involved before deciding whether
employees can self-select their teammates. Given that randomly assigned teams can produce
superior outcomes for tasks that are characterized by a low level of collaboration intensity, our
findings also reveal a weakness in trends towards more “agile work practices” (e.g., Mamoli
and Mole, 2015), which give employees the freedom to choose their working groups regardless
of circumstances.
Moreover, when managers want to create a more inclusive work environment by forming more
diverse teams or teams with a similar average skill level, random team assignment might
prove more beneficial. Our field experiment shows that students are more likely to match
with teammates of the same gender when they are allowed to self-select. This finding suggests
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6 Figures
Figure 1: Sequence of events and data sources
POST-EXPERIMENTPRE-EXPERIMENT EXPERIMENT
TEAM TASK 1 TEAM TASK 2 EXAM SURVEY












Figure displays variables and the sequence of events in the experiments. The sequence of events is
the same for both Experiment I and Experiment II.
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Figure 2: Team assignment, performance, and task characteristics
















































Self Random  95% Confidence interval
Figure shows the average team performance (z-standardized) for the tasks in our experiments. The left panel
shows the results from Experiment I; the right panel, from Experiment II.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Randomization checks
Experiment I Experiment II Experiment I + II
Self Random p-value Self Random p-value Self Random p-value
Pre-experiment data
GPA .057 -.053 .195 .074 -.084 .523 .066 -.068 .134
% female .287 .323 .593 .356 .220 .038 .323 .273 .282
Admissions test
Admissions test score -.024 .026 .533 .007 -.008 .911 -.008 .010 .753
Analytical .022 -.010 .889 -.056 .064 .428 -.019 .026 .666
Presentation .052 -.047 .549 .107 -.122 .125 .080 .083 .141
Interview -.086 .086 .128 -.002 .002 .879 -.042 .045 .344
Discussion -.046 .033 .688 -.017 .019 .932 -.031 .027 .744
Post-experiment data
Pro-sociality -.029 .009 .693 .008 -.010 .899 .001 -.011 .906
Descriptive statistics of pre-experiment data, admissions test scores and pro-sociality. GPA is inverted and z-
standardized, with a higher GPA indicating better school performance. Analytical Test, Presentation, Interview,
and Discussion are z-standardized. p-Values are from a Mann-Whitney U test (two-sided) comparing differences in
mean ranks between both treatments. p-values for the comparison of % female are from a χ2-test (one-sided). The
correlation matrix appears in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Predicting team performance
Dependent variable:
Performance on 1st team task Performance on 2nd team task
(Exp. I and II: written) (Exp. I: written, II: video)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if Self -0.42*** -0.47** -0.48** -0.11 -0.50** -0.52***
(0.14) (0.20) (0.20) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20)
1 if Experiment II -0.05 0.03 -0.39** -0.32*
(0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.16)
1 if Self x 1 if Experiment II 0.11 0.03 0.78*** 0.72**




1 if female -0.03 -0.28*
(0.12) (0.15)
Admissions test score -0.02 -0.07
(0.05) (0.06)
Constant 0.21*** 0.23** 0.24** 0.05 0.25*** 0.34***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Observations 382 382 377 382 382 377
R2 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.07
Columns (1) - (3) show OLS regressions of z-standardized team performance on the first task. In both
experiments students had to submit a written task. Columns (4) - (6) show OLS regressions of z-standardized
team performance on the second task. In Experiment I, students have to submit a written task; in Experiment
II students have to submit a video presentation. Control variables are GPA, admissions test score, and gender.
GPA and admissions score have been z-standardized. Standard errors clustered on teams are in parentheses.
Significance indicators: ∗∗∗ p <.01, ∗∗ p <.05, ∗ p <.1.
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GPA .978 ∗∗∗ 1.117
% female .204 ∗∗∗ .4198
Admissions test
Admissions test score 1.174 1.124






The table displays the average absolute difference between teammates on pre-experiment observables.
Simulation Random denotes the average absolute difference for the respective variable from a simulation
in which we pairwise match all students within a treatment within an experiment. Stars indicate the
two-sided significance level of a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test comparing the observed score against the
simulated value from Simulation Random. Significance indicators: ∗∗∗ p <.01, ∗∗ p <.05, ∗ p <.1.
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Table 4: Predicting self-selection (Treatment Self )
Dependent variable:
Teammate’s GPA Teammate’s Analytical test Teammate’s Pro-sociality
Ind. variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Individual characteristics
GPA 0.25** 0.23** 0.30** -0.00 0.02 0.21** 0.18*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Analytical test -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.15
(0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12)
Pro-sociality 0.17* 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.17*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Teammate characteristics
GPA 0.30*** 0.26*** -0.11 -0.09
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)




Constant 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Observations 184 182 104 182 182 104 106 106 104
R2 0.06 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.09
The table displays the coefficient estimates from specifications using data only from treatment Self. All variables are
z-standardized. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance indicators: ∗∗∗ p <.01, ∗∗ p <.05, ∗ p <.1.
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Table 5: Overview of survey items and survey results
Experiment I Experiment II Experiment I + II
Survey item Random Self Random Self Random Self
Perceived quality of cooperation (1=Not agree, 7=Completely agree)
We communicated a lot. 5.16 <∗ 6.08 5.58 <∗∗ 6.14 5.35 <∗∗∗ 6.11
We helped each other a lot. 5.41 <∗∗ 5.95 5.82 < 6.07 5.60 <∗∗ 6.01
Both team members exerted effort. 5.46 <∗∗ 6.07 5.93 <∗ 6.34 5.67 <∗∗∗ 6.20
Both team members contributed equally. 5.12 <∗ 5.59 5.44 < 5.87 5.26 <∗∗ 5.73
Our individual skills complemented very well. 4.99 <∗∗ 5.56 5.26 < 5.52 5.11 <∗∗ 5.54
Our team was very stressed. 2.87 <∗ 3.30 2.53 < 2.69 2.71 < 3.00
Our team was very motivated. 5.53 < 5.78 5.70 < 5.85 5.61 < 5.81
The mood in our team was good. 5.79 <∗ 6.10 6.19 < 6.27 5.98 < 6.18
The coordination of our team was very good. 5.03 <∗ 5.38 5.56 < 5.59 5.27 < 5.49
I was dominant in leading the team. 4.49 > 4.22 4.30 > 4.21 4.40 > 4.22
One person was dominant in leading the team. 4.10 > 3.84 4.14 > 3.85 4.12 > 3.84
Attitude towards the other (1=Not agree, 7=Completely agree)
My team member is a friend. 3.82 <∗∗∗ 6.25 4.33 <∗∗∗ 6.06 4.06 <∗∗∗ 6.15
I knew the team member very well before the course. 2.60 <∗∗∗ 6.19 2.93 <∗∗∗ 5.66 2.75 <∗∗∗ 5.93
Observations 68 73 57 71 125 144
Table reports descriptive statistics of student responses in the post-experimental survey. P-values stem from a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test for a comparison
of averages between Self and Random. Significance indicators: ∗∗∗ p <.01, ∗∗ p <.05, ∗ p <.1.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Average and variance of performance (z-Standardized)
Experiment I
Self Random p-Value
Performance Avg SD Avg SD MWU Leven’s
Tot. team task -.303*** 1.214*** .297 .621 .007 .002
1st team task (written) -.239** 1.140 .234 .791 .011 .104
2nd team task (written) -.251* 1.248*** .245 .599 .068 .001
Exam -.022 1.004 .028 1.002 .455 .995
Experiment II
Self Random p-Value
Performance Avg SD Avg SD MWU Leven’s
Tot. team task .049 .967 -.089 1.046 .451 .534
1st team task (written) -.196* 1.150 .183 .791 .064 .193
2nd team task (video) .114 .956 -.153 1.047 .156 .381
Exam .004 .989 -.005 1.018 .984 .603
Descriptive statistics (z-Scores) of students performance in the experiment. Avg (SD) shows the average
(standard deviation) of team performance for the team tasks at the team level and for the exam at the
individual student level. MWU p-values stem from a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test for a comparison of
averages between Self and Random. Leven’s p-values are the results of a comparison of variances between
both treatments. p-Values denote results from a Mann-Whitney U test (two-sided) comparing differences in
distribution between both treatments. p-Value for the comparison of % female are the result of a χ2-test.
Significance indicators: ∗∗∗ p <.01, ∗∗ p <.05, ∗ p <.1.
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Table A.2: Pairwise correlations of pre-study data, admissions test score, and performance on team tasks and exam
GPA Female Admissions Analytical Presentation Interview Discussion Pro-sociality Tot. team task 1st Team task 2nd Team task Exam score
GPA 1.000
Female .135∗∗ 1.000
Admissions total .262∗∗∗ -.123∗ 1.000
Analytical .205∗∗∗ -.310∗∗∗ .385∗∗∗ 1.000
Presentation .199∗∗∗ .023 .522∗∗∗ -.020 1.000
Interview .068 -.001 .660∗∗∗ -.120∗ .102∗ 1.000
Discussion .089 .036 .662∗∗∗ -.115∗ .092 .538∗∗∗ 1.000
Pro-sociality -.032 .101 .038 -.106 .091 .008 .107 1.000
Tot. team task .126∗ -.056 .007 .056 -.020 -.000 -.035 .117 1.000
1st Team task .101∗ -.000 .016 -.011 .085 .013 -.062 .064 .566∗∗∗ 1.000
2nd Team task .092 -.073 -.017 .073 -.070 -.029 -.024 .100 .919∗∗∗ .220∗∗∗ 1.000
Exam score .320∗∗∗ -.090 .132∗ .291∗∗∗ .170∗∗ -.092 -.121∗ .020 .122∗ .127∗ .078 1.000
Table displays correlation coefficients of pairwise correlations. Admissions total covers the aggregated score a student received on the admissions day. Analytical, Presentation, Interview, and
Discussion are the score the student received for each respective task during the admissions day. Tot. team task, 1st Task, 2nd, and Exam are the score for the respective performance during the
course. All scores are z-standardized. Table includes data from all treatments and experiments. Significance indicators: ∗∗∗ p <.01, ∗∗ p <.05, ∗ p <.1.
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Table A.3: Predicting random assignment (Treatment Random)
Dependent variable:
Teammate’s GPA Teammate’s Analytical test Teammate’s Pro-sociality
Ind. variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Individual characteristics
GPA 0.03 0.05 0.19 -0.08 -0.32** 0.14 0.15
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10)
Analytical test -0.08 -0.21** 0.01 0.03 0.16 -0.00
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09)
Pro-sociality 0.15 -0.00 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Teammate characteristics
GPA 0.11 0.25* -0.08 -0.10
(0.08) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11)




Constant -0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Observations 180 178 82 178 178 82 82 82 82
R2 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.05
The table displays the results of a OLS regression analysis (robust standard in parentheses). Specifications include
data from treatment Random only. All variables have been z-standardized. Significance indicators: ∗∗∗ p <.01, ∗∗
p <.05, ∗ p <.1.
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